forty-three states changed the design of their driver's license/state identification cards in an effort to reduce underage access to and consumption of alcohol and tobacco. In these states, individuals under the age of 21 are issued licenses that are vertically oriented, whereas licenses for individuals 21 and older retain a traditional horizontal shape. This paper examines the effect of this design change on underage alcohol and tobacco use. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, we find a reduction in drinking and smoking for 16 year olds. These results are robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends, and are upheld in a triple difference model that uses a within state control group of teens that did not receive a vertical license to control for state-specific unobserved factors. Interestingly, we find that the effects of the design change are concentrated in the 1-2 years after a state begins issuing vertical licenses; there is little evidence of an effect of the license on underage consumption in the long-run. This finding is consistent with a scenario where, over time, teens substitute towards other methods of obtaining age-restricted products, and/or retailers continue to make underage sales. 
Introduction
Tobacco and alcohol use by teens and adolescents is a prominent public health issue (Department of Health and Human Services, 2007 and . Research has linked tobacco use with increased rates of lung cancer, as well as respiratory conditions such as asthma (Healthy People Initiative, 2010) . Alcohol use has been linked to adverse health and economic outcomes for teens such as crime (Carpenter, 2005; Carpenter and Dobkin, 2010) , risky sexual behavior (Waddell, 2011; Carpenter, 2005) , reduced employment Mullahy and Sindelar, 1996) , poor academic performance Carrell et al. 2011) , and traffic fatalities (Grant, 2010; Dee, 1999) . The medical and social costs of treating drinking and smoking related illnesses are estimated to be in the billions (Miller et al., 2006; CDC, 2008) .
Since the early 1990s, it has been illegal for individuals in every state to purchase tobacco or alcohol until the ages of 18 and 21, respectively.
1 Violations of this age requirement by consumers (attempting to purchase underage) and retailers (selling to minors) are punishable by monetary fines, revoking retail licenses and driving privileges, and even jail time. 2 Despite the threat of punishment, underage sales continue to occur. Because no systematic data exist on the number of illegal sales made each year, inference about retailer behavior is drawn from "sting" compliance checks wherein law enforcement officials send underage youth into retail 1 During the 1970s and 1980s every state increased their minimum drinking age to 21 to avoid losing federal highway funds (Dee, 1999) . Similarly, all states established a minimum smoking age of 18 by 1994 to prevent loss of Federal Emergency Management Agency funds (American Lung Association, 2010) . 2 Exact punishments vary by state. For instance, currently in Louisiana, both underage teens that buy tobacco and retailers who sell to them can be fined up to $50 for the first violation, $100 for the second, and $400 thereafter (American Lung Association, 2010) . In addition, minors who use falsified identification for these purchases (illegal in all fifty states and D.C.) face additional punishment. Retailers caught selling to a minor who presents false identification are generally protected from punishment if it can be confirmed that the seller came to a reasonable conclusion based on the license appearance that it is valid (Alcohol Policy Institute, 2011). 3 establishments to attempt to purchase alcohol or tobacco with their own underage identification.
These checks reveal that retailers often ignore age requirements; for instance, a national survey issued to retailers who failed compliance checks in 2009 indicates that in 50% of violations the retailer did not ask for identification, and in 30% of cases, the clerk asked for identification, but made the sale anyway. Retailers explain this behavior by claiming they were too busy to check for identification, or that they miscalculated the consumer's age (We Card, 2009 ). Information on consumer behavior is primarily taken from youth surveys. These surveys indicate that teens are knowledgeable about which stores do not ask for identification, or use false identification:
65% of teen smokers from 1995-2005 reported purchasing tobacco without identification, and Lee et al. (2011) find that 10% of teen drinkers and smokers use false identification.
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To combat these illegal sales, the majority of states (forty-three as of 2009) have redesigned their driver's license/identification cards to have a vertical (i.e., portrait-style) orientation for individuals under 21, while those 21 and above continue to receive a horizontal (i.e., landscape)
card. The logic behind this design change is two-fold: First, the vertical design is intended to make it "easier" or "less costly" (in terms of time and effort) for a retailer to identify someone as underage. Perhaps more importantly, the design change eliminates the credibility of retailers to claim "human error" when calculating a consumer's age. Second, it would no longer be effective for youth to falsify the date of birth on their license since the orientation reveals age information.
This paper examines the effect(s) of the vertical license on underage consumption of tobacco and alcohol. Although the vertical license design has been praised for being a low-cost, effective method of reducing underage sales, a priori, it is not clear whether the design change has a meaningful effect on teen consumption of alcohol and tobacco. For instance, while having the vertical license may reduce teens' access to alcohol or tobacco through direct purchases, 3 This figure is based on the authors' calculations using data from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System.
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consumption may not decrease if teens substitute entirely towards other methods of obtaining these products. Moreover, retailers may continue to disregard age requirements even if in theory, the vertical license makes it easier for them to check a consumer's age, simply for profit motivations. We focus on consumption, rather than underage sales, since the latter is difficult to measure, and more importantly, lowering underage consumption is a relevant policy objective. 4 To examine the impact of the vertical license design, we use data on teens from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) along with information on whether, and in which year, states began issuing vertical licenses. We use a difference-in-difference (DD) model that exploits variation across time in the years that states switched to the vertical design. The results indicate that the vertical license is associated with a significant reduction in the probability that 16 year olds smoke or drink by 8-10%. Due to the potential for measurement error in our classification of which teens have a vertical license, these estimates should be interpreted as lower bounds of the effect of the vertical license. We find no effect for 17 and 18 year olds. Our results are robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear and quadratic time trends, and we find no evidence of pre-existing trends in teen outcomes in the years leading up to a state's adoption of the vertical license, alleviating concerns of policy endogeneity. Moreover, our qualitative findings are upheld when we estimate a triple difference model (DDD) where we use a within state control group composed of teens who did not receive the vertical license.
One of the most interesting findings from the analysis is that the effects of the license redesign are primarily concentrated in the short run: The vertical design reduces alcohol and design, whereas in subsequent years, the estimated effects are negative, but small and not statistically significant. In order to better understand why the effects are concentrated in the short run and only among 16 year olds, we examine data on tobacco transactions and sources of tobacco. We find evidence that "experience" with the vertical license is important: 17 year olds who have had a vertical license since age 16 are more likely to seek out retailers that don't ask for identification, whereas "inexperienced" 16 year olds are more likely to be carded after the design change. Moreover, over time, there is evidence that teens seek out other methods to obtain tobacco other than purchasing from retailers. For retailers, we find that after the change, there are fewer retailer compliance check violations, although this estimate is not statistically different from zero. Overall, our results suggest that the design change only had a short-run impact.
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Finally, since changes in alcohol consumption can have an effect on drug use and teen traffic fatalities, we estimate the impact of the vertical license on these outcomes. We find no impact on marijuana use, but we do find a weak negative effect on traffic fatalities among 16 year olds.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the literature and discusses the data. Section III outlines our empirical approach, and Section IV details the results.
Section V provides a discussion and Section VI concludes.
II. Related Literature & Data

A. Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on state policies that are aimed at curbing youth tobacco and alcohol use. Some policies target the sources that teens obtain alcohol and tobacco from (i.e., cigarette vending machines, asking adults to purchase it on their behalf) while others, such as excise taxes, affect teen demand for these products. With respect to alcohol, Dills (2010) 5 Our data do not include information about teens' use of false identification cards or online purchases, thus we are not able to examine whether these methods increased after the design change. See Footnote 33 for more details.
6 examines the impact of social host laws that target third party involvement by holding adults liable for providing alcohol to minors, and finds that the laws do not reduce reports of underage drinking but do reduce drunk-driving fatalities. Carpenter (2003) examines the impact of zero tolerance laws which set the legal blood alcohol content limit for minors at low levels and finds reductions in heavy drinking for males but no effect on self-reported drunk driving. Grant (2010) finds no evidence that zero tolerance laws reduce traffic fatalities. Dee (1999) examines the impact of beer taxes and increasing minimum legal drinking ages and finds the former has no effect, while the latter are associated with decreased consumption.
Numerous studies have examined the responsiveness of youth tobacco demand to price, with mixed results. While some find a decrease in demand when price increases (Lewit et al., 1981; Grossman et al., 1983; Evans and Farrelly, 1998; Carpenter and Cook, 2008; Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997) , others find no effect (DeCicca et al., 2002) . Chaloupka and Grossman (1996) examine the effect of tobacco policies such as restrictions on the location of cigarette vending machines. The authors find inconsistent effects across specifications and conclude that these policies have little impact due to lack of enforcement by states.
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B. Data
The analysis draws on data from a number of sources. We use data from the national Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS), which is a biennial, cross-sectional survey spanning the years 1991-2009. Each survey year, high school students (ages 12 to 18) in schools across the U.S. are surveyed, and information on their demographic characteristics, state of residence, and drug, alcohol and tobacco use is collected. The YRBSS is a comprehensive source of information on teen alcohol and tobacco use and has been used in a number of prior studies 7 (Carpenter and Stehr, 2011; Carpenter and Cook, 2008) . 7 For our analysis, we pool data from all survey years and limit the sample to 16-18 year olds since these teens are the most likely to hold driver's/state identification cards (we elaborate more on this in Section III).
In every survey year each teen is asked about the frequency that he/she used alcohol and tobacco in the month prior to the survey. This includes the number of days in the past month that the individual smoked cigarettes, drank, used chewing tobacco, the number of cigarettes consumed per day, and the number of days where 5 or more drinks were consumed. In the survey years 1995-2009, teens who reported smoking in the past month were asked how they obtained tobacco, and among those that reported buying directly from retailers, they were asked whether or not the seller requested to see their identification (available for years [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Figure 1 documents the percentage of teens that reported drinking or smoking at least once in the month prior to the survey. Although rates of use have decreased over the last two decades, 2009 levels (19.5% for smoking and 41.8% for drinking) are still high.
We supplement the YRBSS data with data on the year each state adopted a vertical license, state-level demographic characteristics, and a series of other policies used by states to reduce underage drinking and smoking. Appendix Table 1 (Dills, 2010; Dee, 1999; Carpenter and Cook, 2008; Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996) .
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We also compile state level data on retailer violation rates during "sting" tobacco compliance we observe the number of drivers of a given age that were involved in a fatal car crash, the exact time of the day the crash took place, and the state where the driver's license was issued.
III.
Empirical Framework
A. Difference-in-Difference Model
To examine the impact of the design change we estimate the following DD model: 12 We identify the impact of the vertical license from within state changes in teen outcomes that are driven by the switch to the vertical license in a particular year (treated), relative to the within state changes in teen outcomes for states where a vertical license was not adopted in that same year or was never adopted at all (control). We use sampling weights provided in the YRBSS, cluster standard errors at the state level, and estimate cluster-robust standard errors to address issues of serial correlation following Bertrand et al. (2001) .
The structure of our data requires us to make a series of assumptions in order to construct . In particular, the YRBSS does not include information on whether an individual has a driver's license/state identification card (by default, there is no information on the shape).
Consequently, we must assign individuals as having a vertical license or not, and to do so we draw on states' licensing requirements, teens' age, and the year a state began issuing vertical licenses. As a starting point, we restrict our sample to 16-18 year olds, assume all these teens hold a license, and assume that all teens receive a license starting at age 16. 13 This is based on the fact that in most states during our sample period, teens gain driving privileges-and thus hold a license-starting at 16. That said, in Section V we discuss how the results change if we assume that teens first receive a license at the age of 15. 14 We define the age when an individual gains driving privileges as the age in which they can first drive without adult supervision. During our sample period, the majority of states in the U.S. shifted to a graduated driver's license system that is composed of three driving levels: (i) Learner: Individuals can begin training under the supervision of licensed drivers and must accumulate a minimum hours or experience, (ii) Intermediate: Unsupervised driving is permitted, but only during daytime hours, (iii) Full Privileges: no restriction on supervision or hours (IIHS, 2011) . For most states and years in our sample period, teens reach the "Learner" stage at age 14 or 15 (in some states it is as late as age 16), and the "Intermediate" level at age 16 (there are a handful of states in the years before 1995 where teens reach this stage by age 15). We reason that teens are most likely to be issued official state licenses once they reach the "Intermediate" stage and are driving unsupervised. Prior to that they likely only carry a paper permit. That said, if teens obtain state licenses during the "Learner" stage, or if some teens reach the "Intermediate" stage at age 15, then our analysis in Section V, where we assume that teens can get a license as early as 15, will address this. 15 All YRBSS surveys took place in the spring (February-May), but the exact interview date is not known.
when we observe 17-18 year olds, they have already held a license for one or two years, suggesting they may have a level of "experience" or "familiarity" with the license which 16 year olds do not have. Familiarity may be important; a 17-18 year old that received a vertical license at age 16 may have discovered methods to "get around" having a vertical license over time. To that end, we conduct our analysis separately by age, which allows us to examine the effect of the design change in the year an individual receives a vertical license, as well as at later ages. If experience with the license is important, we may observe differential effects across age groups.
Our classification of which teens have a vertical license will introduce measurement error into the model in three ways. First, we assume teens first obtain a license at age 16, whereas some may obtain a license at 15. Second, we assume that all teens we observe in the year their state went vertical and in subsequent years, turned their current age after their state adopted a vertical license. Third, we assume all teens that were issued a license before their state switched to the vertical design continued to have a horizontal license, even though some may have obtained a new (vertical) license, say to replace a lost or stolen identification card. In Section V,
we describe a series of sensitivity analyses that we conduct to examine the role of measurement error. Overwhelmingly, these analyses indicate that measurement error does not drive our findings. That said, because measurement error will attenuate our estimates, the results should be interpreted as providing a lower bound estimate of the effect of the vertical license.
B. Policy Endogeneity, Short and Long Run Effects
The identifying assumption for the DD model is that the control observations act as a valid comparison group for the treated observations. This will not hold, if for instance, states that were already experiencing reductions in underage consumption were more likely to adopt the design change in a given year. If this is the case, then the estimated effects will simply reflect a 13 continuation of this pre-existing trend. A related concern is policy endogeneity. It may be that there are unobserved characteristics of states (such as attitudes towards public health) which drive the decision to make the design switch, and are correlated with underage consumption.
While we address these issues in our formal model below, we first provide anecdotal and graphical evidence suggesting that policy endogeneity and pre-existing trends are not a concern.
First, for many states, the timing of the design change coincides with the end of states' multiyear contracts with license card manufacturers. Presumably, states waited until this point in order to avoid incurring costs associated with modifying contracts. In conversations between the authors and one of the largest manufacturers of licenses, it was determined that any changes to the license design that occurs mid-contract would come at a cost of a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. As a result, the exact timing of the design change is likely to be uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity. 16 Second, after September 2001, states were urged at the federal level to adopt new security changes for licenses which would make it harder to forge, such as the use of barcodes, holograms, and design features like the vertical orientation. This is reflected in the rapid increase in vertical licenses post 2001 (see Figure 2 ). This suggests that one motivation for the design change was common to many states, rather than driven by state-specific factors. . For these states, we follow Ayers and Levitt (1998) and construct average consumption t years before/after time 0 using average consumption in these states pegged to the years in which each treated state adopted a vertical license.
6, and 7 plus years before; our omitted category is 1-2 years prior), the year it goes vertical, and the years after it goes vertical (1-2, 3-4, 5-6, and 7 plus years after).
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This latter specification serves two purposes. First, the coefficients on the dummies leading up to the switch reflect whether there is any evidence of pre-existing trends, once we control for other covariates. Second, this specification allows us to examine the short and long run response to the vertical license, which as Figure 3 indicates, may differ. One potential explanation for this is that over time, teens substitute towards other methods to obtain alcohol and tobacco that don't require them to use their vertical license. Additionally, it could be that after the design switch, retailers are more likely to ask for identification and reduce underage sales, but subsequently revert in behavior. We provide evidence on these explanations in Section V.
C. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Model
We supplement our analysis by estimating a triple difference (DDD) model that uses 17-18 year olds who did not receive vertical licenses as a within state control group for their 16 year old counterparts. As discussed above, all 17 and 18 year olds who were observed the year their state went vertical, as well as 18 year olds one year after would not have received a vertical license since only teens that turned 16 after their state went vertical were issued the new license.
The benefit of the DDD model is that it allows us to control for two types of potentially confounding effects: First, the within state comparison allows us to control for unobserved factors that affect the outcomes of all teens that live in a particular state such as state marketing campaigns against underage drinking. Second, the within-age group comparison allows us to control for unobserved factors that affect teens of the same age, regardless of state of residence.
We use 17-18 year olds as the within-state control group rather than younger teens (i.e., 14 year olds) simply because the older teens are in general more likely to hold a license, and thus offer a direct comparison point for how a license redesign may affect teens' ability to use their license to purchase from retailers.
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To implement the DDD model, we must substantially restructure the data, for reasons that will become apparent. First, we divide states into those which switched to the vertical design between 1991-2009 (treated) and those that did not (control). Second, for each treated state we define the "pre" period as the first year we observe YRBSS data immediately before the state went vertical. The "post" period consists of the year the state adopted the license, or one year after. We define "post" this way because these are the only years for which we observe both teens who did and did not have the vertical license in the same state. Consequently, we drop all observations two years after a state goes vertical. We also drop any observations for treated states prior to the "pre" period so that we have a single "pre" and "post" year for each state.
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Third, for the control states, there is no obvious way to define "pre" and "post" since treated states went vertical in various years. No state had a vertical license prior to 1994, and so for the control states we define the "pre" period as any year prior to 1994 and the "post" period as any year after 1994 (inclusive). Appendix Table 1 highlights (underlined) the observation years for each state that we use in the DDD analysis. Finally, we note that structuring our analysis in such a way ignores much of the time variation in our data, but is necessary for the DDD design.
We estimate both a DD and DDD model with the restructured data. The DD model is estimated using 16 year olds and is analogous to Equation 1, but adapted to the two period ("pre"/ "post") setting. The results from this model provide a baseline effect size of the vertical license for the restructured data. Formally, we estimate: should observe a non-zero estimate. In practice, we find no evidence of this. Starting with Column 1, we observe that the vertical license has a negative impact on smoking and drinking in the past month, although only the latter is significant. Conditional on smoking and drinking, there is no impact on intensity, as well as no impact on chewing tobacco.
IV. Results
A. Difference-in-Difference
Moving to Column 2, the point estimates are slightly larger in magnitude for all outcomes except the intensity measures, and the inclusion of the covariates increases precision. The estimates for smoking and drinking are significant at conventional levels and indicate that the vertical license reduced the probability that a 16 year old smoked in the past month by 3 percentage points (10.7% evaluated at the mean), and drank by 3.8 percentage points (8% evaluated at the mean).
Again, the results conditional on smoking and drinking indicate no significant effect of the 22 Logit models produce similar results and are available upon request. In an omitted analysis, also available upon request, we estimate the impact of the vertical license on teen alcohol and tobacco use using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model. This approach is appropriate if the same unobserved characteristics that influence a teen's decision to smoke also influence his/her decision to drink. The results from this model produce similar estimates to those reported in the text.
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design change on the intensive margin. This finding is not entirely surprising since among students who smoke and drink, many of them are "heavy" users (i.e., 48% of smokers smoked more than 20 cigarettes in a month, 63% of drinkers had at least one time when they drank 5 or more drinks in a single setting). The vertical license is unlikely to change the behavior of these "heavy" users who will likely attempt to obtain cigarettes and alcohol regardless. Rather, the results seem to suggest that the vertical design has an impact on the behavior of the marginal student who is deciding whether or not to drink or smoke.
The results in Columns 3 (our preferred specification) and 4 echo the findings from Column 2. With the addition of the linear and quadratic time trends, the estimated effect of the vertical license on teen drinking and smoking is even larger (in absolute value). Comparing the results with and without time trends, the difference in magnitudes suggests that underlying state-specific trends lead to a positive bias, which is consistent with a scenario where states with teens that have a greater unobserved propensity towards consumption are likely to adopt the design change. Tables 1-2 suggest there is no effect for these other outcomes or for 17-18 year olds. Focusing first on the results for the lagged years, the estimates for both drinking and smoking are not statistically different from zero, vary in sign, and in the years immediately leading up to design switch are particularly small, indicating no evidence of systematic, pre-existing trends prior to the switch.
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The estimates for the year a state goes vertical are negative in both columns but are small and not statistically significant. There are two related explanations for why the effect size is small.
One is that not many students are actually issued vertical licenses in the year their state went vertical, and thus we should not expect to see a large effect of the license re-design. Second, we likely misclassify students as having received the vertical design whereas they haven't. This will attenuate the estimates (we elaborate on this in Section V). Moving to 1-2 years after a state goes vertical, we observe a strong negative and significant (at the 10% level) effect, indicating a 4 percentage point reduction in smoking and 7.7 percentage point reduction in drinking. In subsequent years the effects of the vertical license are (with one exception for smoking) small, mostly negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
There are three noteworthy aspects of our DD results. First, we find an effect of the license for 16 year olds but not 17-18 year olds. One explanation for this is that these older teens-who received a vertical license at 16, but we observe their behavior one or two years after-have "experience" with the vertical license and have figured out ways to still consume alcohol and tobacco. Second, the effects of the license do not persist over time. It may be that the first sets of teens who received the vertical license face the most difficulty in purchasing alcohol and tobacco because of it, but subsequent cohorts substitute towards other means of obtaining alcohol and tobacco. Additionally, sellers may initially reduce underage sales (because the license helps identify teens or because of heightened monitoring) but eventually revert back to their prevertical license behavior. Lastly, our estimates are based on a series of assumptions regarding which teens received a vertical license. Measurement error in our classification assignment will attenuate the estimates. We return to these issues in Section V.
B. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference
We present the results of the DDD model in Table 4 for the dependent variables Smoke and Drink. The first half of Table 4 presents the baseline DD model (Equation 2) for 16 year olds.
Results controlling for state fixed effects are presented in Columns 2 and 4. Because we only use a portion of the original data, our sample size is reduced and the estimates are more imprecise. In spite of the sample changes, the average rate of smoking and drinking in this smaller subsample is similar to the entire sample. The DD results indicate similar, although larger (in absolute value), effect sizes compared to Table 1 : The vertical license is associated with a reduction in the probability of drinking by 5.8-7.9 percentage points, and smoking by 5.7-6.7 percentage points (the latter is not significant). Given that the original DD results are upheld in the restructured sample, the DDD estimates will likely provide useful inference on the robustness of our results.
The DDD estimates are shown in the lower half of the Table 4 . Here we present the estimates on the level, double and triple interaction terms. In order to use 17 and 18 year olds as within state comparison groups, it must be that these teens are not impacted by the license change. We examine the coefficient estimate on the interaction term * for evidence of this, and find that the estimates are small and insignificant in all the regressions, suggesting that there are no spillover effects. Turning to the coefficients on the triple interaction, the results indicate that there is a negative effect on smoking and drinking. The probability a 16 year old smoked is reduced by 3.0-4.2 percentage points (the estimates are insignificant) and alcohol consumption is reduced by 7.3-8.4 percentage points. These estimates are in the range of estimates we obtained in Tables 1 and 3 . Overall then, the estimates from the DDD model uphold the DD results.
V. Discussion
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A. Measurement Error
As discussed above, we make a series of assumptions to identify who has a vertical license, and any misclassification will introduce measurement error into our model which will attenuate the estimates. 25 Misclassification stems from three sources. First, teens may receive their license as early as at age 15. In our analysis above we not only ignore 15 year olds, but in addition, we mistakenly classify 16-18 year olds as having received the vertical license one year earlier than they actually did. Second, we assume all teens turned their current age after their state switched to the vertical design, whereas they may have turned their current age beforehand. Third, any teens that received their license prior to their state going vertical may have subsequently obtained a vertical license (say, to replace a lost card). To gauge the extent to which our estimates are affected by measurement error, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses. Overall, the results from these analyses indicate that our quantitative findings are not predominantly driven by measurement error. That said, to the extent that the results are affected by measurement error, the reader should be careful to interpret our results as providing a lower bound effect.
A.1 Sensitivity Analyses
To examine the first type of misclassification, we re-estimate the DD model ( Table 5 . We find no effect of the vertical license design for 15 year olds. One explanation for this result could be that in practice, very few 15 year olds have a license. Alternatively, they may have a license, but require supervision to drive, thus 25 Moreover, it is well known that the attenuating effect of measurement error will be exacerbated in a fixed effects setting, relative to a standard cross section (Angrist and Krueger, 1994; Bollinger, 2001) . We estimate our difference-in-difference model using two-way fixed effects, thus attenuation could be particularly severe.
23
limiting opportunities to purchase alcohol and tobacco.
The estimates for 15 year olds also serve as a "falsification test" for our main results. A concern with the results in Tables 1-3 is that The estimates in Table 5 indicate that indeed the vertical license does not have an impact on these teens' behavior.
26
For 17 and 18 year olds, we continue to observe no significant effect of the license. This suggests that even if the results in Table 2 are attenuated as a result of the fact that we (incorrectly) assume that teens first receive a license at age 16, the attenuation is not so severe that it causes us to falsely conclude there is no effect of the license for 17-18 year olds. Among 16 year olds, the effect of the license is negative and statistically significant, upholding our results from Table 1 . Given that we find no effect for 15 year olds, we return to assuming that teens first receive their license at age 16 for the remaining analyses.
The second, and perhaps most pervasive source of measurement error stems from the fact that we assume all teens that are 16 in the year their state went vertical received a vertical license, as did 17 and 18 year olds one and two years later, respectively. In practice, some of these teens are likely to hold a horizontal license. It is important to note this type of misclassification only affects our classification of 16 year olds in the year their state went vertical, 16 and 17 year olds one year after, and 18 year olds two years after going vertical.
27 26 We conducted a similar falsification test using 14 year olds (omitted for brevity but available upon request), and also found no significant effect of the license. 27 Consider the following example. and 2008 and forward, respectively. This classification is identical to the one used to produce the results in Table 5 . As discussed above, we continue to find no significant effect for 17-18 year olds, but do find effects for 16 year olds which are similar to those in Table 1 .
As our second alternative classification, rather than construct Vertical as a binary variable for whether or not a teen has a vertical license, we assign a "fractional value" between 0 and 1 for Table 1 . We continue to find no effect for older teens. This check is less than ideal since it (potentially) comes at the cost of removing observations that are correctly specified, and lowers precision. However, this result, combined with the estimates in Table 5 overall provide strong suggestive evidence that our main results are robust to even the most problematic type of misclassification.
The third type of misclassification arises if teens obtain a new vertical license. We cannot gauge the extent to which this occurs, but we can examine how the results change if we assume all 17-18 year olds obtained a vertical license even though they were not required to do so. We now classify all 17-18 year olds in the year their state went vertical and beyond as having the vertical license, and present the results in the lower half of Table 6 . We find no effect, suggesting that the null effects in Table 2 are not driven by this type of measurement error.
A.2 Bounds
If a binary regressor is measured with error, we can construct upper and lower bounds for the effect of that mis-measured variable on the outcome (Aigner, 1973; Bollinger, 1996 which implies a reduction in these activities by 200-400%. This is clearly infeasible.
As discussed by Bollinger (1996 and , the upper bound that is estimated under the assumption of maximum measurement error is rather uninformative because it produces implausibly large effect sizes. Furthermore, the upper bound is very sensitive to additional information about the extent of the error, and much can be gained by estimating the bounds under stricter assumptions about the level of measurement error. Given that we have no prior about the extent of the error, we calculate the bounds assuming we have 75%, 50%, and 25% of the maximum estimated error. 1996, 2001 ). These new upper bounds indicate that while measurement error will undoubtedly attenuate our coefficient estimates, so long as it is lower than the maximum possible value, the results in Tables 1-6 still provide useful and relevant information regarding the effect of the vertical license design.
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B. Mechanisms
Our results indicate the vertical license reduces underage consumption only in the first year a teen receives the license (age 16), and moreover, the effects are concentrated in the short-run.
These results seem to be consistent with a story where: (i) as teens get older, they gain more "experience" and find ways to consume age-restricted products, (ii) the first sets of teens to be issued the new license are the most restricted by the design change but subsequent cohorts adapt around it, and (iii) initially retailers are less likely to make underage sales due to increased awareness of the new license (marketing campaigns often accompany the design switch) or increased monitoring, but subsequently they revert to selling to minors, for profit motivations.
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We examine how teens respond to the vertical license by utilizing information in the YRBSS on how teens access cigarettes. Teens that smoked in the past month were asked where they obtained cigarettes, and we group these responses into four categories (values in parentheses represent the percentage of 16-17 year old teens who report using this source, averaged across years): (i) store (30%), (ii) gave someone money to buy them for me (28%), (iii) bummed them (29%), and (iv) obtained from vending machine, stole, and other (13%). We estimate a multinomial logit DD model where the dependent variable is the cigarette source, and independent variables are a series of time dummies for the years prior to, during, and after the switch, along with all to covariates in Equation 1 (the omitted category is 3 plus years before).
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their maxima (Bollinger, 1996) . Maximum values for p are similar for drinking and smoking (7.4% and 7.2%), as are values for q (19.5% and 19.6%), respectively. In our analysis where we vary the extent of measurement error, 75% of the error translates to p=5.44% and q=14.75%, in the case of drinking. We also estimate the bounds under various combinations of error, such as setting p at 90% of the maximum value, and q at 50%. Results are similar to those provided in the text. All calculations are omitted for brevity but available upon request. 30 For instance, in Michigan, the vertical license was introduced via a large marketing campaign ("We Check To Protect") that advertised the design change and explained the rationale behind it. 31 An additional category, "A person above 18 gave them to me" was added in the 2001-2009 surveys. To maintain uniformity in response categories throughout the 1995-2009 sample, we omit this response from the analysis. We group steal/vending/other into a single category to increase cell size. We include a series of time dummies for the years prior to a state going vertical (1-2, 3 plus) the year a state goes vertical, and the years after (1-2, 3-4, 5 plus).
We graph the coefficient estimates on the time dummies in Figure 4 , where our base category is "gave someone money". 32 In the years leading up to the design change, store purchases and vending/steal/other are relatively flat, and we observe a slight increase in bumming. After the switch, there is a clear decrease in purchases from stores and bumming, suggesting that it may have become difficult for teens to purchase cigarettes directly, as well as to bum from friends who likely also have a vertical license. In contrast, the use of vending/stealing/other slightly increases. Teens may also increase their use of false identification (with horizontal orientation and false birthday) or online purchases after the vertical license is introduced, but this is not measured in the YRBSS data (besides perhaps being included in the "other" category) and thus cannot be examined directly. 33 Over time, store purchases level off and then continue to decline, and there is a greater movement towards vending/stealing/other and bumming-the latter may be due to teens seeking out friends who are still able to obtain cigarettes.
Overall, the patterns in Figure 4 are largely consistent with the results from Table 3 : Initially, the vertical license prevents teens from accessing tobacco and thus decreases smoking, but subsequently, teens substitute towards other methods and smoking levels revert back.
An additional piece of evidence is provided in the upper half of Table 7 . Here we present the results of the DD model (Equation 1), where we replace the dependent variable with an indicator for whether or not a teen was asked to show identification when he/she attempted to purchase cigarettes from a store (conditional on smoking and purchasing from a store). We estimate the model separately for 16 and 17 year olds. For 16 year olds, we find that the vertical license
We group all years prior to 3 years before a state goes vertical to increase cell size. That is, because information about where teens obtain cigarettes only began to be collected in 1995, there is little information for the earliest adopting states (i.e., 1994 or 1996) about where teens access cigarettes prior to adoption. 32 We estimate this model for 16-17 year olds (N=14,129). None of the coefficient estimates are statistically different from zero because the standard errors are imprecisely estimated. Regression results available upon request. 33 It seems likely that teens would still need to show proof of age when making online purchases. Moreover, many states have made false identification possession a criminal offense, which carries jail time as a punishment. Given the severity of the punishment, substitution towards fake identification cards may be limited.
increases the probability of being asked to show an id by 9 percentage points, whereas for 17 year olds, there is an 8 percentage point decrease. These results suggest that, following the design change, retailers are more likely to ask for identification, but this only affects 16 year olds. Older teens that have had more experience with the license likely seek out retailers who do not pay attention to age requirements and thus are able to continue to consume tobacco.
To examine retailer behavior directly, we turn to data on tobacco retailer compliance checks which are conducted under the Synar Amendment. We estimate a DD model (similar to Equation 1), where our dependent variable is now a binary indicator equal to one if a state's target rate exceeds their violation rate in a given year, and zero otherwise. The results are presented in the lower half of Table 7 . In the models with and without time trends, we find a positive relationship between the license and the probability of meeting the target violation rate, although the estimates are imprecise and not statistically different from zero. Table 8 (Columns 1 and 2). We find no significant effect on marijuana use, even when we include state-specific time trends, suggesting there are no residual effects on drug use.
To evaluate the impact of the vertical license on teen traffic fatalities, we turn to two sources of information. First, in the YRBSS teens are asked whether or not they drove a car after drinking alcohol in the past month. In the upper half of 35 We study accidents 35 In contrast to other studies, our unit of analysis is a count of drivers involved in fatal crashes by the state in which a license is issued rather than the number of fatal crashes that occur in a given state. This is because one crash may involve multiple drivers of different ages and from different license states and therefore we cannot assign one crash to a particular license state. The only case where the two counts will coincide is if the crash involved just one driver or more drivers of the same age from the same license state. The data on the state population of licensed drivers of a 31 that happened at any time during the day and also accidents that took place between 9:00 pm and 5:00 am since most alcohol-related traffic fatalities involving young drivers occur at night (Dee and Evans, 2001; Grant, 2011) . In both cases we find no strong evidence that the policy switch had a significant effect on the number of 16 year-old drivers involved in traffic fatalities.
However, we do find a stronger effect on nighttime crashes; the estimates are larger in magnitude and statistically significant at 10% level when state-specific time trends are included.
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VI. Conclusion
Reducing alcohol and tobacco use has been a long-standing goal of public health organizations and public officials. Particular emphasis has been placed on developing policies to reduce consumption among teens and adolescents, not only because of the immediate, negative health and economic consequences of these activities, but also because habits formed early in life often extend into adulthood (Riordan, 2009; NSDUH, 2004) .
In an attempt to combat underage sales of tobacco and alcohol, over the past 15 years, the majority of states have redesigned their driver's license/identification cards to offer an instant visual cue regarding the license holder's age. The switch to a vertical license is viewed by many public officials as a potentially effective way of reducing teen access to and consumption of tobacco and alcohol. Additionally, the design change comes at no additional cost to retailers or consumers, which is in contrast to say, an alcohol or tobacco excise tax. The new design has been supported by stakeholders from all sides of the debate; for instance, the switch to a vertical license in Michigan was endorsed by various state beer, wine, and alcohol wholesaler and retailer given age from 1994-2009 are available by the Federal Highway Administration. Finally, following Ruhm (1996) , regressions are appropriately weighted to account for heteroskedasticity. 36 In an omitted analysis (available upon request), we examine the impact of the vertical license on crashes involving 17-18 year olds. We consistently find effect sizes that are smaller (in absolute value) than for 16 year olds, vary in sign, and are not statistically significant.
associations, the state police department, as well as parent and student associations.
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The switch to the vertical design has been the object of little controversy. This is in contrast to say, other targeted policies that states have used for reducing teen alcohol and tobacco use, such as excise taxes or social host laws. While both of these policies have been found in some studies to reduce teen tobacco use and drunk driving fatalities, respectively, they have also been the object of debate on the grounds of reducing profits for retailers, punishing low-income consumers, and infringing on the personal rights of parents. Thus an interesting question that arises with the vertical license is whether an arguably well-supported, non-divisive policy is actually effective at reducing underage drinking and smoking.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no rigorous examination of whether the design change is effective at reducing underage alcohol and tobacco consumption. We find evidence that the vertical license reduces underage consumption for 16 year old teens in the first year they receive the license, but subsequently there is no effect. We also find the design change has the biggest deterrent effect in the 1-2 years after a state switches to the vertical design, but thereafter there is little evidence of long run persistence. These results can be rationalized in the context of teen learning and/or seller disregard for age requirements. *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and YRBSS sampling weights are used in all regressions. All regressions include the control variables described in the text. *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
